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future selves (Kahneman and Thaler, 1991). Our results are robust to different measures of 
strategic voting and subjective well-being. 
 
 
JEL Codes:  D72, D03, I31 
Keywords:  Happiness, life satisfaction, strategic voting, political ideology 
 
 
Francesca Acacia 
University of Edinburgh 
School of Economics 
31 Buccleuch Place 
Edinburgh,  EH8 9JT, United Kingdom 
E-mail: francescar.acacia@gmail.com 
 
Maria Cubel 
University of Barcelona & IEB 
Dept of Public Economics 
Avda. Diagonal 690 
08034 Barcelona, Spain 
Email: cubel@ub.edu 
 
 
 
1 Introduction
In recent years, an increasing number of disciplines have explored the deter-
minants of happiness and subjective well-being. In the economic literature,
for the last twenty years, research on this issue has focused on identifying
the impact on happiness of a large number of factors. We can distinguish
between three di¤erent groups of determinants of happiness. The rst one is
individual socio-demographic characteristics such as age, gender, education,
and marital status. The second group includes socio-economic factors such
as income, social class, and employment status. And the last one consists
of macroeconomic variables such as GDP, unemployment rate, ination, etc.
(See e.g., Clark and Oswald, 1996; Di Tella et al., 2001; Di Tella et al., 2010;
van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2008).
However, even after accounting for a wide range of characteristics de-
scribed above, happiness still remains largely unexplained. If money can buy
happiness, why do some people living in the richest countries have a low level
of happiness? (Easterlin, 2001). Being married is a source of happiness, but
then why is it that divorce is so common. Other intriguing facts are that
the relationship between age and happiness seems to be U-shaped (Oswald,
1997) and that being unemployed produces more unhappiness than the one
corresponding to the equivalent income loss (Frey and Stutzer, 2000).
Only recently, a strand of the economic literature has focused its attention
on the relationship between political behaviour and well-being, happiness and
life satisfaction. The rst attempt to explore the relationship between voting
decisions and subjective well-being (henceforth SWB) was Radcli¤ (2001).
He showed that SWB is positively a¤ected by the presence of a Left-Wing
Government. However, this result is not unequivocal. Di Tella and Mac-
Culloch (2005) found that the SWB of right-wing individuals is positively
a¤ected by the presence of a government leaning towards the right of the
ideological spectrum. Their result nds corroboration in the work of Napier
and Jost (2008) who explained this positive relationship by means of the
propensity of right-wing voters to justify income inequalities. In their study
on Swiss Cantons, Frey and Stutzer (2002) found that the degree of direct
democracy a¤ects life satisfaction signicantly. They link citizen participa-
tion to the level of monitoring of politiciansactivity. In their view, a stricter
control by citizens translates into the implementation of policies that are
closer to the bliss point of the citizenry: satisfaction with the government
choice is mirrored in a higher level of well-being.
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Dolan et al. (2008) reversed the problem posed by Frey and Stutzer (2002)
and studied for the rst time the casual relationship between the decision
to vote and SWB. They found that the probability of casting a ballot is not
a¤ected by life satisfaction. However, when they take into account individual
political a¢ liation, they show that conservatives with higher SWB are less
likely to vote. All the papers above disagree on which side of the ideological
spectrum foster SBW. However, they seem to agree on the high importance
of the ideological position of the government and citizens in individual well-
being.
In this paper we explore whether individual life satisfaction and happiness
is a¤ected by the way in which people exercise their legal right to vote.
Specically, we test whether voterslife satisfaction is higher or lower when
they engage in strategic voting. We use data on a large sample of individuals
over 50 elections in 16 OECD countries. The years taken into account span
from 1975 to 2002. We nd that life satisfaction decreases with strategic
voting for left-wing voters. In addition, the negative impact of strategic
voting is only signicant when the voted party is elected. However, right-wing
voters seem to be una¤ected by strategic voting and this occurs regardless
of the electoral outcome. We obtain that strategic voting is more relevant
for life satisfaction than the relative position of the government compared to
that of the individual in the ideological left-right spectrum.
There are two major reasons why strategic voting can be expected to
negatively a¤ect voterslife satisfaction. Firstly, because peoples thoughts
and feelings are inuenced by the actual, imagined, or implicit presence of
other members of their recognizable group (Allport, 1985). People can feel
socially inuenced even when no other people are actually present, for in-
stance through television or internalized cultural norms. When it comes to
political elections, individuals identify themselves with the political party
that best represents their own interest, or the interest of people with who
they share a political ideology. From that perspective, every time a citizen
casts her vote for a political party di¤erent from the one that best represents
her preferences, she may feel that she has betrayed her political group and
experience a loss in happiness.
Secondly, the act of voting itself represents a self a¢ rmation of all the val-
ues and beliefs that constitute the essence of a person. Voting for a political
party is a declaration of what a voter thinks about redistribution, economic
policies, welfare and so on. In this light, voting strategically amounts to lying
about the own essence. It is commonly accepted in modern psychology that
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the act of lying is a source of stress for the individual because, for instance,
it undermines self-image (Ariely, 2012). If a voter votes for a political party
di¤erent from the one she prefers the most, she may undergo the same type
of stress associated to lying. This then translates into a lower level of life
satisfaction and happiness.
To the best of our knowledge this paper represents the rst attempt to
address the impact of strategic voting on happiness and life satisfaction. Our
paper relates closely to some previous work which explores the relationship
between happiness and political participation. More specically, Flavin and
Keane (2012) argue that subjective well being inuences political participa-
tion. Thus, when people feel satised with their life they are more prone to
vote and participate in public life. Weitz-Shapiro and Winters (2011) focus
their attention on the direction of causality between happiness and voting.
Using Latin America data they nd that individual happiness a¤ects vot-
ing but not the other way around. Barker and Martin (2011) discuss some
empirical evidence on the link between happiness and political participation.
They conclude that, although there is some evidence supporting the connec-
tion between political participation and happiness, there is stronger evidence
showing that happy people participate more in democratic processes. We
depart from this literature in two ways: rst, we focus our analysis on the
impact of voting on individual happiness; and second, we specically explore
the e¤ect of strategic voting on well being rather than of general voting.
As it is standard in this literature, we use data on individual life satisfac-
tion as a measure of subjective well being. Notwithstanding, as a robustness
check, we also use data on happiness and subjective well being dened as in
Inglehart et al. (2008). These authors point out that life satisfaction and
happiness are highly correlated but they pick up di¤erent aspects of individ-
uals life. Thus, life satisfaction is assumed to be strongly tied to economic
conditions while happiness is supposed to be a more emotional perception
of well being. Hence, Inglehart et al. (2008) suggest a third measure of
subjective well being which is just a linear combination of happiness and life
satisfaction. This measure provides a more complete measure of well being
since economic conditions and emotional feelings are both complementary
measures of subjective well being.
The remainder of the paper is organized in four sections. Section 2 de-
scribes the data and the procedure used to built our variables of interest.
Section 3 describes the empirical methodology. Section 4 discusses the re-
sults, and Section 5 concludes.
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2 Data
The data that we use in this study is drawn from a variety of sources. The
main variable is based on the Mannhein Standard Euro-Barometer" (hence-
forth "Euro-Barometer"), compiled by the European Commission. This data-
base collects information on SWB, voting behaviour, and demographic char-
acteristics from over half million face-to-face interviews in 16 OECD coun-
tries. The period of time of interest spans from 1973 to 2002. The dependent
variable (SWB) used for our analysis is based on the answer to the following
question: On the whole, are you very satised, not very satised or not at all
satised with the life you lead?". The respondent had four available answers:
Very Satised", Fairly Satised", Not Very Satised", and Not at all
satised" 1. We merged these categories in order to create a dichotomous
variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent declared to be very or fairly
satised with her life and zero otherwise. We focused on strategic voting as
the major explanatory variable. To identify an strategic voter, we relied on
the denition given by spatial voting theory: a voter is considered to vote
sincerely in an election if she casts her ballot in favour of the candidate whose
ideological position is closest to her own (given the ideological positions of
all the candidates in the election). In short, to vote sincerely means having
a clear preference for a particular political party or candidate and to vote
accordingly.
We assume that when an individual does not vote for her most preferred
party she is casting a strategic ballot. Such voting behavior can be based on
other considerations such as helping to bring about a certain coalition gov-
ernment, showing like/dislike for a certain candidate or punishing a political
party for its past behavior. To identify who are the strategic voters in our
sample, we rst need to dene the political party which is the nearest political
party to the ideological preference of each voter. Next we check whether vot-
ers actually did vote for their most preferred party identied in this way. In
order to do this, we matched the data contained in the Mapping Policy Pref-
erences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Government 1945-2002(Budge
et al., 2001) with some of the information contained in the Eurobarometer.
The rst dataset allowed us to locate each political party running in an
election on a Left-Right unidimensional ideological spectrum. The second
dataset provides information on the self-reported ideological position of each
1We did not include in our analysis the categories Do not know" and No answer".
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voter. This information is obtained from the following question: when it
comes to politics, do you usually think of yourself as extremely liberal, liberal,
slightly liberal, moderate, middle of road, slightly conservative, conservative,
extremely conservative? Indicate your preferences on a ten-point political
scale (1 being extreme left, 10 being extreme right)";. To identify the nearest
party to the ideological preferences of each voter, we calculated the euclid-
ean distance between the self-reported individual ideological preference and
the ideological position of each competing party in a certain election. We
then chose the party for which this distance was the minimum. Finally, we
combined this information with the answer to the following question: in the
last election, which party did you vote?". We consider that an individual
votes sincerely when she casts his ballot for the party whose political plat-
form (along the ideological space) is the closest to the one she prefers the
most. Otherwise, she is considered to vote strategically.2 Strategic voting is
thus dened as a dichotomous variable which takes the value of one when a
vote is strategic and zero when a vote is sincere.
3 Empirical Strategy
In order to test whether the propensity to report a high level of subjective
well-being is a¤ected by the way in which people vote, we use a logit model.
The econometric specication can be written as follow:
Satisfactioni;c;t = + Strategici;c;t + Demoi;c;t + Socio-econi;c;t + i;c;t
where subscripts i, c and t refer to individuals, countries and time, respec-
tively. As we showed in the previous section, the dependent variable Satisfac-
tion measures the individuals propensity to report being satised with her
life. This variable is dichotomous and takes the value of 1 when responders
report that they are satised and zero otherwise. The variable Strategic in-
dicates whether an individual cast her vote in favour of the candidate whose
ideological position is the closet to her own or not (given the ideological po-
sition of all the other candidate in an election). The set of demographic and
socioeconomic variables we consider include individual characteristics which
the literature shows to relate to individual satisfaction and happiness (van
Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2008). In particular, demographic variables re-
fer to personal attributes of the respondents. They include: age (grouped in
2See Acacia (2011), for more detailed information.
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three intervals ranging from 18 to 99 years old), gender, education (low or
high education), relationship status (single, married, cohabit, divorced), hav-
ing children or not, employment status (unemployed, self-employed, manual
workers, owner of a shop, professional, retired, house keeper). As socioeco-
nomic variables, we include family income and unemployment rate.
All our estimates include country xed e¤ects, time xed e¤ects, and
their interaction. They are mainly designed to minimize any unobserved
heterogeneity that could be correlated with our explanatory variables.
4 Estimation Results
First of all, it is worth noticing that in each specication that we discuss
in this chapter the demographic and economic variables yield very similar
results (in sign and magnitude) to the ones previously found in the litera-
ture (van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2008). For example, Table 1 shows
that young people have a larger probability of being satised with their life
compared to middle-aged individuals. On the contrary, old people have a
higher probability to be happy compared to young individuals. People who
are married or live together with their partner have a higher probability of
reporting feeling satised. People with higher education have a larger proba-
bility of being satised than low educated individuals. Income has a similar
e¤ect: richer individuals are more likely to report being satised.
Regarding our research question, our primary specication lends sup-
port to the idea that strategic voting has an important impact on individual
life-satisfaction. The results from Table 1 conrm that a voter has a lower
probability of being satised if she decides to cast her vote for a political
party which is not the one nearest to her ideological position. More specif-
ically, voting for a party which is not the most preferred one decreases the
probability of a voter being satised by 1.2%. This result seems to contradict
the rationality assumption underlying the theory of voting. If people are util-
ity (or hedonistic) maximizers and vote in a strategic way, thus decreasing
their satisfaction, why do they do it? As Kahneman and Thaler (1991) have
pointed out some choices that people make may involve a lack of empathy
for the future self who will have to live with those choices". This failure in
forecasting the cost (interpreted as a decrease in satisfaction) of their choice
may mislead them to vote for a political party that is not the nearest to their
ideologypreferences.
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In order to investigate further this self-damaging e¤ect of strategic voting,
we separated the data into two sub-samples, one for left-wing individuals and
another for right-wing individuals We classied individuals on left-wing and
right-wing using the dataset "mapping policy preferences" of Budge et al
(2001). We used an ideological space from 1 to 10, being 1 extreme left and
10 extreme right. We classied people reporting preferences from 1 to 5 as
left-wingers and people from 6 to 10 as right-wingers. This analysis yields
an interesting result (see Table 3). The negative coe¢ cient associated with
strategic voting is still signicant at the one per cent level for those voters
leaning towards the left of the political spectrum. However, for right-wing
voters the coe¢ cient becomes insignicant.
Result 1: Strategic voting reduces the individual life satisfaction of leftist
voters but not of rightist voters.
This is not an intuitive nding. There is not obvious a piori reason why
the negative impact of strategic voting on life satisfaction should be asym-
metric across the political spectrum. Our conjecture is that it could be driven
by the result of the electoral race since happiness and life satisfaction may be
a¤ected by the outcome of the election via the policies that will be eventually
implemented. In order to check this hypothesis we extend our specication
by taking into account the result of the electoral competition, that is, we
include information on whether the party the individual voted for won the
election or not. Table 4 shows that voting strategically a¤ects negatively the
probability of being satised when the party the individual voted for is in-
deed elected. On the contrary, when the voted party is not elected, strategic
voting does not a¤ect the probability of an individual reporting herself as
satised with her life.
Result 2: Strategic voting reduces life satisfaction if the party the indi-
vidual voted for wins the election.
A possible explanation for this result may be grounded on the sources of
utility from voting. The classical theory of voting considers that individuals
may obtain utility from the act of voting itself if by voting they feel that
they are good citizens and are fullling their civic duty (Downs, 1957; Riker
and Ordeshook, 1968). But individuals may also choose to vote as a form
of expressive behavior (Hillman, 2010; Hamlin and Jennings, 2011). For
example, voters may use their vote to express dislike for a candidate or for
the past decisions of a party, even when voting is costly. More relevant for
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the analysis, an individual may decide to vote against her ideology in order to
express a particular feeling, usually one of complain or protest. The objective
of this form of voting, called expressive voting, is not to inuence the result
of the election but to obtain utility thorough the act of voting itself as an
act of self-rea¢ rmation. This theory is compatible with our results. Result 2
might be due to the individuals who voted for a party which ended up winning
the election, but who did not actually want that party to be elected. They
might have just used their vote to express their dissatisfaction with their most
ideologically preferred party, perhaps because they disliked its past behavior
or their running candidate. Under that interpretation, strategic voters vote
against their ideology in order to obtain expressive utility at the moment
of casting their ballot and because they do not expect to actually "su¤er"
the policies they vote for, i.e. they do not expect their vote to change the
outcome of the election. And when their not-so-preferred alternative wins,
these voters experience a decrease in happiness or life-satisfaction. Hillman
(2010) refers to this as a "expressive-policy trap". Alternatively, voters might
be actually aware of the negative impact of the election of a party di¤erent
from their most preferred one in their future well-being, but they choose to
ignore it. This may be the case if individuals discount heavily the future or
if they regard their future self as a separate person and feel little empathy
for her (Kahneman and Thaler, 1991).
When we take into consideration the political preferences of the voters,
the results vary between left and right-wing voters (Table 5). People leaning
towards the left of the political spectrum and who voted strategically for the
party which did win the electoral race su¤er a decrease in the likelihood of
reporting themselves as satised. However, the probability of being satis-
ed for a right-wing voter does not depend on whether she voted sincerely
or strategically for the party which won the election; the coe¢ cient asso-
ciated with strategic voting for that subsample remains negative but it is
no longer signicant. Hence, we could argue that left-wing individuals who
voted strategically were expressing their dissatisfaction with their preferred
party or, alternatively, that they were myopic about the e¤ects of their voting
decisions on their future satisfaction.
In order to check the robustness of our results we considered an alternative
measure of strategic voting. To build this alternative variable we used the
following question from the Euro-Barometer: generally speaking do you feel
closer to one of the national political parties than the other? If yes, which
one?" We compare the answer to this question with the one about their vote
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in the last election. We create a dichotomous variable that takes the value
of one if the party they feel close to is not the same as the party they voted
for, i.e. a strategic vote, and the value of zero otherwise, i.e. sincere vote.
Table 2 (column 3) shows the results of the regression with this new measure
of strategic voting. This variable is still signicant at the ve per cent level
of signicance. In addition, we also check that our results are robust to
di¤erent measures of well being. Thus, results hold when we use a measure
of happiness instead of our satisfaction measure. Also, the obtained results
remain we using a measure of subjective well-being which is calculated as
a linear combination of happiness and satisfaction following the procedure
proposed by Inglehart et al (2008) (see Table 2).
Finally, and in order to check that our results are robust to the estimation
method, we estimate our primary specication using OLS. We obtain that
the OLS estimates o¤er the same qualitative results as the ordered logit.
Moreover, it is worth pointing out that all our estimates report standard
errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity of unspecied form.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have explored the impact of strategic voting on subjective
well-being. Specically, our results bring evidence that ideological consider-
ations display a sizeable inuence on the reported level of life satisfaction.
Voting for a political party with a platform far away from a persons own
ideological preferences decreases her subjective life satisfaction. We found
however that this e¤ect is asymmetrical across the political spectrum. Left
wing strategic voters su¤er from a decrease on their probability of being sat-
ised with their lives while no e¤ect appears for right-wing strategic voters.
We then looked at the outcome of the electoral race because we wanted
to investigate whether there was a disassociation between the act of voting
and the actual outcome from of the election. Expressive voting theory and/or
lack of empathy for future selves can explain why voters who voted an elected
party may feel unhappy with the nal outcome of the election. Results
indeed show evidence of the presence of these factors. Again these e¤ects
only a¤ected left-wing voters.
Admittedly, this asymmetry across the political spectrum is the most
intriguing of our results. Unfortunately, our database does not allow us to
disentangle the reasons behind this. Our conjecture is that right-wing voters
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might be less motivated by ideology and thus be less prone to expressive
motivations. If ideology is less salient for a voter this implies that she is less
likely to punish their prefer party according to ideology. Another conjecture
is that non-ideological motives may be more silent for right-wing voters. This
may be the case when electoral competition takes place in other dimension
apart from the left-right dimension such us nationalism, religion or race.
These are avenues for further research that the present work leaves opened.
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(Coeff) (Sdt error)
Strategic -0.126*** (0.037)
Age: Middle -0.095*** (0.035)
Old 0.330*** (0.067)
Female 0.124*** (0.032)
Education to age: <=15 -0.484*** (0.045)
>=18 0.183*** (0.051)
Marital status: Separeted -0.534*** (0.110)
Divorced -0.245*** (0.079)
Single 0.186*** (0.063)
Married 0.237*** (0.052)
De facto 0.577*** (0.119)
Child -0.118*** (0.035)
Income level: <=4000 -0.313*** (0.038)
>=8000 0.459*** (0.038)
Working Status: Unemployed -0.958*** (0.057)
Self-employed -0.459*** (0.078)
Manual worker -0.179*** (0.050)
Owner of a Shop 0.153 (0.119)
Professional -0.097 (0.105)
House keeper -0.092 (0.056)
Retired -0.091 (0.056)
F(21, 490) 75.44***
Prob > F (0.000)
N 59,429
Note: Probit regressions with robust standard errors. All regressions include year and country
dummies, country-specific time trends.
Table 1 - General Result
                        Subjective Life Satisfaction Dependent Variable
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(a) (b) (c)
Dependent Var Happyness LifeSat-Happy Life Sat
Strategic -0.175*** -0.228***
(0.091) (0.067)
Strategic_alternative -0.180***
(0.049)
Age: Middle -0.252*** -0.179*** -0.042
(0.084) (0.059) (0.046)
Old 0.374*** 0.497*** 0.379***
(0.147) (0.080) (0.081)
Female 0.009*** 0.741 0.151***
(0.082) (0.049) (0.040)
Education to age:<=15 -0.494*** -0.459*** -0.504***
(0.116) (0.083) (0.052)
>=18 0.049*** 0.048 0.200***
(0.120) (0.069) (0.054)
Marital status: Separeted -0.524*** -0.444* -0.470***
(0.231) (0.234) (0.140)
Divorced -0.447*** -0.300 -0.267***
(0.079) (0.222) (0.183)
Single 0.144*** 0.284** 0.119
(0.063) (0.112) (0.078)
Married 0.610*** 0.534*** 0.290***
(0.135) (0.101) (0.060)
De facto 0.924*** 0.717*** 0.639***
(0.389) (0.236) (0.140)
Child -0.033*** -0.075*** -0.113**
(0.051) (0.047) (0.045)
Income level: <=4000 -0.285*** -0.374*** -0.406***
(0.083) (0.092) (0.047)
>=8000 0.311*** 0.333*** 0.429***
(0.120) (0.079) (0.049)
Working Status: Unemployed -0.852*** -0.636*** -0.974***
(0.186) (0.159) (0.078)
Self-employed -0.374*** -0.141 -0.175
(0.395) (0.254) (0.112)
Manual worker -0.128*** -0.080 -0.145**
(0.139) (0.083) (0.062)
Owner of a Shop 0.324 0.147 -0.112
(0.412) (0.261) (0.134)
Professional '-0.112
(0.128)
House keeper -0.139 0.067 -0.065
(0.141) (0.103) (0.070)
Retired -0.325 -0.082 -0.029
(0.197) (0.119) (0.064)
F(20, 72) 13.27*** F(19, 73)20.66*** F(21, 384)58.79***
Prob > F (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 9,412 9,412 35,344
Table 2 - Robustness Check
Note: All regressions include: robust standard errors;  year and country dummies and country-specific
time trends. Regression (b) cut poins: Cut1=-2.13(0.133); Cut2=-1.04 (0.125); Cut3=0.982(0.122);
Cut4=2.053(0.122).
Omitted Omitted
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(a) (b)
Dependent Var Left Right
Strategic -0.150*** -0.070
(0.048) (0.057)
Age: Middle -0.063 -0.164***
(0.044) (0.051)
Old 0.326*** 0.276***
(0.087) (0.086)
Female 0.175*** 0.60
(0.042) (0.048)
Education to age: <=15 -0.498*** -0.452***
(0.055) (0.055)
>=18 0.166*** 0.202***
(0.059) (0.063)
Marital status: Separeted -0.461*** -0.621***
(0.151) (0.166)
Divorced -0.156 -0.343***
(0.115) (0.111)
Single 0.127 0.261***
(0.082) (0.094)
Married 0.232*** 0.324***
(0.076) (0.065)
De facto 0.557*** 0.609***
(0.144) (0.154)
Child -0.123*** -0.103*
(0.040) (0.056)
Income level: <=4000 -0.316*** -0.301***
(0.051) (0.056)
>=8000 0.384*** 0.533***
(0.045) (0.061)
Working Status: Unemployed -1.008*** -0.853***
(0.075) (0.081)
Self-employed -0.566*** -0.406***
(0.112) (0.106)
Manual worker -0.079 -0.291***
(0.064) (0.075)
Owner of a Shop 0.200 0.145
(0.145) (0.157)
Professional -0.123 -0.025
(0.140) (0.151)
House keeper -0.120* 0.060
(0.066) (0.077)
Retired -0.112 -0.057
(0.074) (0.081)
F(21, 470) 48.36*** F(21, 488) 46.38***
Prob > F (0.000) (0.000)
N 30,022 29,407
Table 3 - Ideological Preferences
Note: All regressions include: robust standard errors;  year and country dummies and
country-specific time trends.
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(a) (b)
Dependent Var Yes No
Strategic -0.288*** 0.132
(0.064) (0.049)
Age: Middle -0.101* -0.120***
(0.055) (0.043)
Old 0.334*** 0.287***
(0.088) (0.087)
Female 0.021 0.209***
(0.047) (0.046)
Education to age: <=15 -0.489*** -0.483***
(0.064) (0.056)
>=18 0.136*** 0.221***
(0.060) (0.062)
Marital status: Separeted -0.682*** -0.369**
(0.169) (0.146)
Divorced -0.368*** -0.105
(0.125) (0.095)
Single 0.147 0.242***
(0.091) (0.081)
Married 0.251*** 0.318***
(0.070) (0.074)
De facto 0.400*** 0.741***
(0.145) (0.145)
Child -0.087*** -0.140***
(0.049) (0.045)
Income level: <=4000 -0.367*** -0.281***
(0.053) (0.049)
>=8000 0.536*** 0.404***
(0.061) (0.045)
Working Status: Unemployed -0.895*** -1.006***
(0.080) (0.067)
Self-employed -0.418*** -0.505***
(0.114) (0.104)
Manual worker -0.141* -0.183***
(0.080) (0.061)
Owner of a Shop 0.046 0.224
(0.153) (0.143)
Professional 0.114 -0.222
(0.501) (0.142)
House keeper 0.028 -0.229***
(0.073) (0.074)
Retired 0.014 -0.174**
(0.079) (0.073)
F(21, 483) 42.26*** F(21, 489) 51.32***
Prob > F (0.000) (0.000)
N 28,575 30,535
Table 4 - Party voted for is part of the new government
Note: All regressions include: robust standard errors;  year and country dummies and
country-specific time trends.
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(a) (b)
Dependent Var Left Right
Strategic -0.404*** -0.135
(0.080) (0.095)
Age: Middle -0.106 -0.113
(0.077) (0.075)
Old 0.287** 0.357***
(0.125) (0.117)
Female 0.013 0.031
(0.075) (0.063)
Education to age: <=15 -0.315*** -0.612***
(0.080) (0.080)
>=18 0.197*** 0.090
(0.070) (0.086)
Marital status: Separeted -0.706*** -0.668***
(0.243) (0.220)
Divorced -0.383** -0.357**
(0.196) (0.157)
Single 0.150 0.148
(0.149) (0.128)
Married 0.248** 0.259***
(0.127) (0.080)
De facto 0.188 0.662***
(0.213) (0.209)
Child -0.093 -0.086
(0.066) (0.069)
Income level: <=4000 -0.448*** -0.305***
(0.078) (0.075)
>=8000 0.348*** 0.672***
(0.073) (0.090)
Working Status: Unemployed -0.963*** -0.857***
(0.119) (0.113)
Self-employed -0.649*** -0.295**
(0.213) (0.138)
Manual worker -0.133 -0.162
(0.113) (0.106)
Owner of a Shop 0.185 -0.173
(0.252) (0.195)
Professional -0.004 0.183
(0.258) (0.218)
House keeper 0.024 -0.029
(0.117) (0.092)
Retired -0.093 -0.078
(0.122) (0.104)
F(21, 438) 22.14*** F(21, 471) 27.14***
Prob > F (0.000) (0.000)
N 11,942 16,633
Table 5 - By ideology when the party voted for is elected
Note: All regressions include: robust standard errors;  year and country dummies and
country-specific time trends.
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